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Abstract—A new collaborative learning, called split learning,
was recently introduced, aiming to protect user data privacy
without revealing raw input data to a server. It collaboratively
runs a deep neural network model where the model is split
into two parts, one for the client and the other for the server.
Therefore, the server has no direct access to raw data processed
at the client. Until now, the split learning is believed to be a
promising approach to protect the client’s raw data; for example,
the client’s data was protected in healthcare image applications
using 2D convolutional neural network (CNN) models. However,
it is still unclear whether the split learning can be applied to
other deep learning models, in particular, 1D CNN.
In this paper, we examine whether split learning can be used
to perform privacy-preserving training for 1D CNN models. To
answer this, we first design and implement an 1D CNN model
under split learning and validate its efficacy in detecting heart
abnormalities using medical ECG data. We observed that the 1D
CNN model under split learning can achieve the same accuracy of
98.9% like the original (non-split) model. However, our evaluation
demonstrates that split learning may fail to protect the raw data
privacy on 1D CNN models. To address the observed privacy
leakage in split learning, we adopt two privacy leakage mitigation
techniques: 1) adding more hidden layers to the client side
and 2) applying differential privacy. Although those mitigation
techniques are helpful in reducing privacy leakage, they have a
significant impact on model accuracy. Hence, based on those
results, we conclude that split learning alone would not be
sufficient to maintain the confidentiality of raw sequential data
in 1D CNN models.
Index Terms—split learning, neural networks, privacy leakage,
1D CNN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has been successfully applied to many appli-
cations, including genomics [1] and healthcare systems [2]. In
such health applications, those models monitor patients’ status
effectively and detect their disease earlier. To achieve high
accuracy of deep learning models, they need to be trained with
sufficient data collected from a wide range of institutions [3].
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However, sharing raw data, especially in health applications,
may raise privacy concerns that violate certain rules such
as reusing the data indiscriminately and risk-agnostic data
processing [4] required by General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [5] and HIPAA [6].
In 2018, Otkrist et al. [3] introduced a new collaborative
learning technique, called split learning, to protect user privacy
by allowing training without sharing users’ raw data to the
server that runs a deep neural network (DNN) model [7], [8].
Generally, split learning divides the DNN layers into two parts
(A and B) between client and server. The client, who owns the
raw data, trains part A that consists of the first few layers using
forward propagation and only sends their activated outputs
from the split layer (the last layer of the part A) to the server.
After receiving the activated outputs from the client, the server
performs the forward training with those outputs on part B.
Next, the server runs the backward propagation on part B and
only sends back the gradients of the activated outputs of the
split layer (first layer of part B) to the client to complete the
backward propagation on part A. This process continues until
the model is converged.
Goals of split learning are: 1) the raw data is no longer
required to be shared with the server, 2) the model classifica-
tion accuracy is comparable to the non-split model [3], and 3)
reducing the computational overhead of the client who only
needs to run a few layers rather than the whole model. To date,
the effectiveness of split learning has been validated in vision
domains such as the medical image classification problem via
a 2D convolutional neural network (CNN) [8]. However, health
data includes not only images but also sequential/time-series
data such as ECG signals.
As a first study towards exploring the feasibility of split
learning to deal with sequential data, we adopt an 1D CNN
model for detecting heart abnormalities using ECG signals that
are collected from electrodes attached to human skin [9] as a
case study. Recently, several 1D CNN models were introduced
to classify sequential data, including biomedical ECG signals
[10], [11], [12]. Considering the fact that the exposure of raw
ECG data would raise privacy concerns because ECG signals
can reveal people’s disease status and also be used to identify
people uniquely [13], it is crucial to protect the privacy of raw
data for 1D CNN models. Split learning would be a promising
candidate to fulfill this privacy requirement.
This work is dedicated to investigating the answers to the
following two research questions (RQs):
RQ 1: Can split learning be applied to deal with sequential
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2or time-series data in particularly using 1D CNN to achieve
comparable model accuracy as that of trained on centralized
data?
To answer RQ 1, we first investigate the applicability of
split learning to 1D CNN models to deal with sequential data.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first elaborated study
on split learning using 1D CNN models, where we confirm
that split learning is applicable to sequential data.
RQ 2: Can split learning be used to protect privacy in
sequential data trained using 1D CNN?
Then, we focus on understanding the privacy leakage of
split learning to answer RQ 2. We find that the impact of split
learning was rather limited to reduce privacy leakage.
Correspondingly, we have made the following contributions:
• We implement1 split learning on 1D CNN model and ap-
ply it for time-series sequential data exemplified by using
ECG signals to detect heart abnormalities, where sharing
medical data with other party is inherently avoided but
can still achieve the same accuracy of the non-split model.
• We propose a privacy assessment framework for CNN
models employing split learning, with three metrics: vi-
sual invertibility, distance correlation [14], and Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) [15]. This is to answer RQ 2. We
observed that direct application of split learning into 1D
CNN has a high privacy leakage in the applications with
sensitive data such as ECG signals.
• To address the shortcoming of direct application of split
learning into 1D CNN, we apply two countermeasures: i)
increasing the number of convolutional layers of a CNN
model split at the client and ii) exploiting differential
privacy. The results suggest that although these tech-
niques seem helpful to reduce privacy leakage, they have
a significant impact on the accuracy of the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides background information about CNN, split learning,
and privacy issues in using deep neural network models on
cloud services. The design and implementation of split learn-
ing on 1D CNN are detailed in Section III. Section IV analyzes
the privacy leakage question on 1D CNN models under split
learning based on our identified threat model. Section V
discusses the possibility of two mitigation techniques and
evaluates them. Section VI discusses our findings and future
work. Section VII presents the related work, followed by the
conclusion in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides the necessary information to un-
derstand our work. It includes an 1D convolutional neural
network, split learning technique, and privacy issues in the
field of machine learning.
A. 1D Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
A CNN is a part of broader machine learning methods based
on artificial neural networks where input feature extraction is
1 https://github.com/SharifAbuadbba/split-learning-1D
performed automatically [16]. A 1D CNN for classification
problem can be depicted as a mapping function fΘ : Rn×c →
Rm that maps an input x ∈ Rn×c to an output yˆ ∈ Rm
based on the calculated parameters Θ, where n is the length
of input vector, c is the number of input channels, and m is
the number of classes. For example, let us assume x is an
ECG sample taken from a patient that has to be classified
by fΘ into yˆ as a vector of probabilities corresponding to
5 different types of heartbeat diseases. The output with the
highest value, arg maxi∈{1. .5}yˆi, is a final prediction from
the model in which x is most likely to be, e.g., ‘A’ (atrial
premature contraction).
A CNN is constructed with L hidden layers. Each layer l,
l ∈ {1 . . L}, has nl neurons, and activated output a(l). The
vector consists of values of each neuron of that layer, and it is
computed in a feed-forward propagation manner as follows:
a(l) = g(l)(w(l)a(l−1) + b(l)) ∀ l ∈ {1 . . L} (1)
where g(l) : Rn → Rn is a non-linear activation function
of layer l that ensures only crucial neurons to be fired (i.e.,
> 0) and forwards its output as an input to the next layer.
w(l) ∈ Rnl×nl−1 is the weights and b(l) ∈ Rnl is the biases;
both of them are learned during training. The CNN output
of the L layer, i.e., the last hidden layer, is a function which
can be calculated as yˆi = a(L) = g(L)(w(L+1)a(L) + b(L+1)).
After performing forward propagation reaching the output yi,
the difference between the ground truth label yi and predicted
yˆi is calculated as the loss Ei = (yi − yˆi)2, in case of using
squared loss. Then, the contribution of every w towards this
loss is calculated in a backpropagation way. For that, the
partial derivatives of the loss with respect to each individual
weight is calculated. As an example, we present the calculation
with respect to a single weight w(L)12 that connects node 2 in
layer L− 1 to node 1 in Layer L as follows:
∂Ei
∂w
(L)
12
= (
∂Ei
∂a
(L)
1
)(
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(L)
1
∂z
(L)
1
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∂z
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1
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12
) (2)
= 2(a
(L)
1 − yi)(g(L)′(z(L)1 ))(a(L−1)2 ) (3)
where g(L) is the activation function of layer L and z(L) is
the input for that neuron.
The widely used CNN models are 1D and 2D CNN. The
2D CNN is popular in image recognition to extract features
from 2D images. The 1D CNN also recently produced several
promising results in extracting features from sequential time-
series data [12]. Both types are using similar steps as in
Equation (1), (2) and (3), but the major difference is the
structure of the input data and how the convolution filter, also
known as a kernel or feature detector, moves across the data
for feature extraction. The shape of convolution filter (kernel)
is a vector form in 1D CNN and usually 2D matrix form in
2D CNN, as shown in Fig. 1.
B. Split Learning
Split learning is a distributed deep learning technique that
splits a CNN into two parts; the first part is provided to the
3Kernel: Feature DetectorKernel: Feature Detector
1D CNN 2D CNN
e.g. RGB value of single 
pixel within an image
e.g. a single value 
within ECG signal
Fig. 1. 1D CNN vs. 2D CNN in feature detection. The shape of convolution
filter is a vector form in 1D CNN while a 2D matrix form in 2D CNN.
client and the second part to the server. Both client and server
collaboratively train the split model without accessing each
other’s part. To perform the split learning for 2D CNN models,
several networks such as LeNet, VGG, and AlexNet were
considered and validated [3].
C. Privacy Preserving Machine Learning
Cloud servers or major model providers have been popularly
used for collecting and processing data. However, users often
have privacy concerns when their sensitive data is processed
and stored at cloud servers [17]. In practice, user data on
the cloud server can be misused to identify individuals even
though their explicit identifier information is not provided. For
example, a previous study [13] showed ECG signals can be
used to uniquely identify individuals. Perhaps, identification of
individuals may violate important privacy rules such as reusing
the data indiscriminately, and risk-agnostic data processing [4]
required by regulations such as GDPR in Europe [5].
In this regard, the privacy-preserving machine learning
technique through distributed learning, such as federated learn-
ing [18] and split learning [7], is promising. Split learning as
the focus of this work aims to reduce the privacy leakage
of sensitive localized data by splitting the network during
training—allowing raw data being remained in the data owner
(i.e., client). However, there is a possibility of privacy leakage
from the information sent from the client during the machine
learning process. Precisely, the privacy leakage is that given
the activation at the split layer l, i.e., a(l), how much one (the
server) infers about the training data x.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPLIT 1D
CNN
In this section, we design and implement the split 1D CNN
to answer the RQ 1: Can split learning be applied to deal with
sequential/time-series data in particularly using 1D CNN to
achieve comparable model accuracy as that of trained on
centralized data?
We first introduce the 1D CNN ECG classification models
[11], [12] that we reproduced. We then detail our imple-
mentation of splitting the 1D CNN model. Consequently, we
validate that the split 1D CNN is able to achieve the same
model accuracy of the non-split 1D CNN, where our RQ 1 is
answered.
A. 1D CNN for ECG Signal Classification
In this section, we describe the non-split version of 1D CNN
ECG classification models, which were recently introduced to
classify ECG signals [12], [11], [19], [20], [21]. We chose
two 1D CNN model architectures given in [11] and [12] as
they are most recent and showed the best-achieved accuracy.
Both works [11], [12] aim to classify ECG signals into 5
classes with less than or equal to 5 layers of 1D CNN. For the
model architecture in [11], it has three 1D CNN layers and
two fully connected layers, exhibiting about 96.6% accuracy.
In [12], only two 1D convolutional layers are used with two
fully connected layers, demonstrating about 97.5% accuracy.
We first implement these original non-split model from those
two studies and then implement them using split learning to
validate consistency in the model accuracy.
1) ECG Dataset and Preprocessing.: We use MIT-BIH
arrhythmia [22] which is a popular dataset for ECG signal
classification or arrhythmia diagnosis detection models. Ar-
rhythmia is short for Abnormal Heart Rythm, which is an
indication of various heart diseases. Following the models
[11], [12], we collect 26,490 samples in total which represents
5 types of heartbeat as classification targets: N (normal beat),
L (left bundle branch block), R (right bundle branch block),
A (atrial premature contraction), V (ventricular premature
contraction). We normalize these samples and remove the
noise before feeding them to the 1D CNN as shown in Fig. 2.
We explain the detailed preprocessing steps in Appendix A.
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Fig. 2. ECG signals before and after preprocessing.
2) 1D CNN Model Architecture.: The first 1D CNN [12]
model architecture we adopted is illustrated in Fig. 3 (a).
Specifically, each convolutional layer has 16 filters: the size
of the filter used for the first convolutional layer is 7, and 5
for the rest. Zero padding is applied before each convolution
operation. Rather than ReLU, Leaky ReLU is chosen as an
activation function of hidden layers to prevent the dying ReLU
problem. Softmax is used for the activation function of the last
fully connected layer. We call this model ‘two-layer model’.
The second 1D CNN model adopted by us [11] is with three
1D convolutional layers (see Fig. 3 (b)), termed as ‘three-layer
model’. Parameter settings are similar to the two-layer model.
3) Training Result.: Table I shows our training and testing
dataset distribution which follows a similar proportion setting
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Fig. 3. 1D CNN for ECG signal classification using (a) two or (b) three 1D
convolutional layers.
TABLE I
ECG DATASET SPECIFICATIONS.
Class N L R A V Total
Train 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,245 3,000 13,245
Test 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,245 3,000 13,245
Total 6,000 6,000 6,000 2,490 6,000 26,490
for each of 5 classes as in the previous work [12]. Both two-
layer model and three-layer model are trained with 400 epochs,
respectively. The learning rate is set to 0.001. Adam optimizer
with a batch size of 32 is set.
We measure the accuracy of the models on the test set,
after each epoch. As shown in Fig. 5 (non-split), both models’
accuracy converged to 98% around or less than 200 epochs.
The accuracy is not necessarily improved after reaching the
optimal value. The test accuracy of two-layer model is 98.9%,
which is also similar to the test accuracy of three-layer
model. Note that the original work by Dan et al. [12] that
we follow shows a 97.5% accuracy in a similar setting. In
other words, we have successfully reproduced their work
and slightly improved the accuracy, where the improvement
attributes to the small modifications in hyper-parameters and
data preprocessing steps, as detailed in Appendix A.
B. Splitting 1D CNN
We now split the above 1D CNN models. We focus on two
parties in the split learning setting: the client and the server. As
we show later, the leakage is resulted from passing the forward
activation to the server, which is irrelevant to the number of
participated clients.
The 1D CNN model is split into two parts, A and B as
shown in Fig. 4. Activation and gradients are passed between
client and server to collaboratively train the joint model.
We follow the vertical split method [3], [7] to split 1D CNN.
Those previous studies provide the conceptual process of split
learning for 2D CNN models and show that model accuracy
of split training is the same as that in the non-split training [3],
[7]. Other than focusing on 2D CNN models as [3], [7], we,
ECG
Client e.g, hospital Server: computing power
Pass Activations
Pass Gradients
Part A: first layers Part B: remaining layers
Split Layer Output 
Input 
samples
Fig. 4. Split learning overview.
Algorithm 1: Split learning on the client side
Initialization:
s← socket initialized with port and address
s.connect(Bob)
φ, η, o, n,N ← s.synchronize()
{w(i)}∀i∈{0. .l} ← initialize using φ
{z(i)}∀i∈{0. .l}, {a(i)}∀i∈{0. .l} ← ∅
{ ∂E
∂z(i)
}∀i∈{0. .l}, { ∂E∂a(i) }∀i∈{0. .l} ← ∅
for each batch (x, y) generated from D do
Forward propagation:
a(0) ← x
for i← 1 to l do
z(i) ← f (i)(a(i−1))
a(i) ← g(i)(z(i))
s.send((a(l), y))
Backward propagation:
∂E
∂a(l)
← s.receive()
for i← l downto 1 do
∂E
∂z(i)
← ∂E
∂a(i)
× g(i)′(z(i))
Compute ∂E
∂w(i)
using ∂E
∂z(i)
and a(i−1)
Update w(i) using η, ∂E
∂w(i)
, and o
if i 6= 1 then
∂E
∂a(i−1) ← f
(i)
T (
∂E
∂z(i)
)
s.close()
herein, elaborate on 1D CNN split implementation strategies
for client and server sides, respectively (see Algorithm 1 and
2). Those detailed algorithms can be useful as a guideline for
implementing split learning models. We also clearly specify
what information is exchanged between client and server with
the socket instructions in the pseudocodes in Algorithm 1 and
2, which will be especially helpful for practitioners along with
our source code.
1) Client.: Assume a model that has L layers—input layer
is excluded—in total. The L-th layer is the output layer, and
the remaining layers are hidden layers. Suppose that the model
is split between layer l and layer l+ 1. The client holds first l
layers from the layer 1 to l—part A, whereas the server holds
remaining layers from the layer l+1 to L—part B. Weights in
the layer i are denoted as w(i). In addition, let f (i) denotes the
forward propagation over the i-th layer, and z(i) denotes the
output tensor just after the forward propagation in i-th layer.
a(i) is denoted as the output after the activation function in
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Fig. 5. Accuracy over the training of split and non-split 1D CNN models. Notably, we have set the exact same initial weights through using the equivalent
random seed, for both split and non-split tests in this example.
Algorithm 2: Split learning on the server side
Initialization:
s← server socket initialized with port and address
sA ← s.accept(Alice)
φ, η, o, n,N ← sA.synchronize()
{w(i)}∀i∈{l+1. .L} ← initialize using φ
{z(i)}∀i∈{l+1. .L}, {a(i)}∀i∈{l. .L} ← ∅
{ ∂E
∂z(i)
}∀i∈{l+1. .L}, { ∂E∂a(i) }∀i∈{l. .L} ← ∅
for i← 1 to N do
Forward propagation:
(a(l), y)← sA.receive()
for i← l + 1 to L do
z(i) ← f (i)(a(i−1))
a(i) ← g(i)(z(i))
E ← L(a(L), y)
Backward propagation:
Compute ∂E
∂a(L)
for i← L downto l + 1 do
∂E
∂z(i)
← ∂E
∂a(i)
× g(i)′(z(i))
Compute ∂E
∂w(i)
, using ∂E
∂z(i)
and a(i−1)
Update w(i), using η, ∂E
∂w(i)
, and o
∂E
∂a(i−1) ← f
(i)
T (
∂E
∂z(i)
)
sA.send(
∂E
∂a(i)
)
sA.close()
layer i, which can be given by a(i) = g(i)(z(i)), where g(i) is
the activation function of i-th layer. In backpropagation, f (i)T
denotes the function which returns the gradient of activation
of layer i−1, using weights and gradient of i-th layer. Finally,
when the client has the ECG raw dataset D to train with, the
split learning process on client follows Algorithm 1.
The client first connects to the server via socket and
synchronizes some train configurations. With a single batch
given from D, the client forward propagates it until the l-th
layer and sends the activation a(l) from the l-th layer to the
server. When the client receives the gradient of ∂E
∂a(l)
from the
server, the backpropagation continues to the first hidden layer.
2) Server.: The server continues forward propagation after
receiving activation from l-th layer. The server then calculates
the loss between the activated output from the last layer and
the label passed from the client. Let E denotes the loss
calculated from the loss function L. With E, the server starts
backpropagation until layer l + 1. The server finally sends
the gradient of the output to the client, which is ∂E
∂a(l)
, to
make the client continues the backpropagation. The rest of the
denotations except E and L, are the same as used in Algorithm
1.
The training flow between the client and the server is
illustrated in Fig. 6 and further detailed in Appendix A.
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Fig. 6. Data flow between the client and the server in Algorithm 1 and 2.
3) Influence on Performance: Based on the implementa-
tion above, we test the split learning on both 1D CNN model
architectures: two-layer model and three-layer model. We split
the former after two convolutional layers and latter after three
convolutional layers. To measure and compare the influence
of split learning on performance accurately, we initialize both
models before and after the split with the same set of weights.
Fig. 5 depicts the exact accuracy conversion of both models
before/after applying split. It is clear that the accuracy is the
same. In other words, our split learning implementation has
no noticeable impact on the performance of the models.
Summary: Split learning can be applied into 1D CNN without
the model classification accuracy degradation as demonstrated
in Fig. 5. Therefore, RQ 1 can be is answered affirmatively.
IV. PRIVACY LEAKAGE ANALYSIS
In this section, we propose a privacy assessment framework
under our identified threat model to answer the RQ 2: Can
split learning be used to protect privacy in sequential/time-
series data trained using 1D CNN?
This framework has three metrics: visual invertibility, dis-
tance correlation and Dynamic Time Warping. Based on
these metrics, we present our empirical results validated from
6systematic experiments to demonstrate that it is possible to re-
construct raw data from the activation of the intermediate split
layer, which indicates that our RQ 2 is answered unfavourably.
We firstly elaborate on the considered threat model.
A. Threat Model
We consider the server is an honest-but-curious single entity
adversary. It performs all its operations as specified, but
curious about the raw data localized at the client. We assume
that the server has no access to the client’s device, and it
does not target attacks on those devices. Furthermore, the
server does not collude with any client. The server’s goal is
to reconstruct the raw data (e.g., the client’s medical data)
from the activated vector of the split layer, which is delivered
from the client during the forward propagation. We assume
that all participating clients are trusted, and they participate
in the learning process provided that the raw data always
remain within their custody. In the health domain, examples
of trusted clients are patients, hospitals, and (health) research
organizations.
B. Visual Invertibility
We first visualize each channel of the split layer output as an
initial assessment to observe the possibility of reconstructing
the original ECG signals. The model batch size is 32 (i.e., the
number of ECG samples fed to the model) and uses 16 filters
to extract features. These filters produce the layer activation,
which is passed to the server from any split layer. Fig. 7
shows 5 different classes of original ECG samples on the top
row vs. the reconstructed version from 5 corresponding filters
activation after two layers on the bottom row. We can observe
that there is high similarity between them, which means the
possibility of significant leakage.
Our framework goes further to generalise this observation
by measuring the correlations between the split layer activation
and original samples. To quantify our results, we employ two
other metrics: distance correlation and Dynamic Time Warping
as explained below.
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Fig. 7. Visual invertibility. Top row shows raw input data. Bottom row shows
one of the channels in the output from the second convolutional layer.
C. Distance Correlation
In statistics, distance correlation is a measure of dependence
between two paired vectors of arbitrary dimensions. It is on the
scale of 0-to-1. Distance correlation of 0 refers to independent
vectors, whereas 1 means highly dependent and fully similar.
Distance correlation has already been used in the context of
deep learning to measure the autoencoder correlation [14]
and reconstruction of raw data from intermediate layers of
2D CNN [23]. Therefore, we apply distance correlation as a
measure to monitor the dependency between each channel of
split layer output and corresponding raw ECG signal.
The distance correlation of two random variables is assessed
by dividing their distance covariance by the product of their
distance standard deviations, given below (4) [24].
dCor(X,Y ) =
dCov(X,Y )√
dVar(X) dVar(Y )
(4)
To get the distance correlation between raw input and the
split layer activation, we firstly pick 10K of ECG signals from
the dataset. Then we take the average of distance correlations
from 10K samples, which come between raw ECG signal and
split layer output channels. We call this, distance correlation
mean. Because the distance correlation measurement requires
two vectors with same dimension, we apply average down-
sampling on the original ECG signal, to adapt its size to
corresponding split layer output.
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Fig. 8. Distance correlation and DTW between raw input and the activated
outputs after two and three 1D convolutional split layers, respectively. Each
dot represents the channel of the split layer output.
Fig. 8 (a) shows the distance correlation mean between 16
channels of the split layer activation and corresponding raw
data. We repeat these experiments after two and three convolu-
tional layers, respectively. Splitting after two layers, the results
suggest that the correlation of the top channels activation is
very high (0.89), which indicates high leakage and can be
exploited to reconstruct the raw data, as shown previously
in Fig. 7, visual invertibility. Similarly, some channels of the
activation after three layers exhibits high dependency, as well.
However, the correlation of the top channels is reduced by
(0.03); from (0.89) to (0.86) between splitting after 2 and 3
layers. This gives us intuition to increase the number of layers
as a mitigation strategy investigated in the next section.
D. Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)
To generalise our observations, we utilize another well-
known similarity measurement in time series analysis called
7Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [15]. DTW is an algorithm
that can accurately measure the similarity between two tem-
poral sequences, which may vary in speed. It is widely used
in speech recognition and signature recognition.
Given two time series X = (x1, x2, ..., xN ) and Y =
(y1, y2, ..., yM ), represented by a sequence of values, DTW al-
gorithm starts by constructing the distance matrix C ∈ RN×M
representing all pairwise distances between X and Y . This
distance matrix, also called as local cost matrix Cl, for the
alignment of two sequences X and Y is calculated as follows:
Cl ∈ RN×M : cij = ‖xi − yj‖ , i ∈ {1 . . N}, j ∈ {1 . . M}
(5)
Once the local cost matrix is constructed, the algorithm
explores the alignment path (or warping path), which runs
through the low-cost areas. The warping path which has the
lowest cost associated with alignment is called the optimal
warping path. The length of optimal warping path is finally
used as a measurement of the similarity between X and Y .
Zero-length optimal warping path refers to high similarity,
whereas increasing length of optimal warping path toward,
e.g., 1000 means higher dissimilarity. In this paper, we apply
DTW as a measure to monitor the similarity between each
split layer filter activation and corresponding raw ECG signal.
For the measurement, we go through the same process
mentioned in Section IV-C but with DTW, and we call
this, DTW mean. Unlike distance correlation, DTW can be
computed although two vectors have different sizes, so we do
not apply any downsampling on the original data in this case.
Fig. 8 (b) shows the mean of DTW between the intermediate
split layer of all 16 channels activation and corresponding
raw data. We also conduct this experiment with split layer
output at second and third convolutional layers, respectively.
Splitting after two layers, DTW indicates that the similarity of
the top channels activation, which also exhibits high leakage
and can be exploited to reconstruct the raw data as visually
shown previously in Fig 7. Similarly, the channels output after
three layers shows high similarity; Again, the top DTW mean
increases by 0.21; from 2.70 to 2.98 between splitting after
two and three layers. Furthermore, the lowest DTW mean
increases significantly to more than 30, by adding one more
convolutional layer. This suggests that increasing the number
of layers may reduce the leakage.
Summary: Our leakage analysis framework to test our RQ 2
via three empirical (visual invertibility) and numerical metrics
(distance correlation and DTW) indicates that activated output
after two and three convolutional layers can be used to recon-
struct the raw data. In other words, sharing the intermediate
activation from these layers may result in severe privacy
leakage. Therefore, RQ 2 is answered unfavourably.
V. MITIGATE THE SHORTCOMING?
To further answer our RQ 2, we investigate a number of
strategies which can be deployed in 1D CNN model to mitigate
the privacy leakage. Specifically, we apply and evaluate two
mitigation techniques to reduce potential privacy leakage by
i) adding more hidden layers before splitting and ii) applying
differential privacy on split layer activation before transmitting
them to the server. We measure the efficacy of mitigation
techniques via both i) privacy leakage reduction using distance
correlation and DTW as well as ii) model accuracy after
applying mitigation techniques.
A. Adding More Hidden Layers
Specifically, we add more convolutional layers—ranging
from two to eight—to the client before the split layer. In other
words, the model architecture becomes more complex, given
the number of layers held by the server being constant. To
be consistent, the layers to be added use same configuration
as illustrated in III-A2. Each additional convolutional layer
utilizes 16 filters whose size is 5. Zero padding is applied to
keep the size of output as a power of 2. Moreover, the size of
the filter used for each newly added hidden convolutional layer
is 5. Leaky ReLU is also selected for newly added layers. We
select activation function as Leaky ReLU, rather than ReLU,
to prevent the dying ReLU problem.
Distance Correlation Mean: Fig. 9 (a) shows the mean of
distance correlation between the intermediate split layer of all
16 channels output and corresponding raw data after second
to eighth convolutional layer. The correlation of each channel
is measured against the corresponding raw ECG signal and
represented as a dot in the figure. We then sort the distance
correlation mean in descending order on the Y-axis, where
distance correlation of 1 indicates a high risk of leakage, and
0 means low risk. It is clear from the top correlated filters
that there is a slight reduction in the distance correlation
from (0.89) to (0.69) as the number of hidden convolutional
layers increases; however, there is still some highly correlated
channels whose distance correlation means are above 0.5.
DTW Mean: Fig. 9 (b) further shows the mean of DTW
between the intermediate split layer of all 16 channels acti-
vation and corresponding raw data after second to the eighth
layer. The similarity of each filter is calculated against the
corresponding raw data ECG and represented as a dot in
the figure. We again grade the mean similarity in ascending
order from 0 as a high risk of leakage to 600+ as low
risk. It is clear from the channels that there is a significant
dissimilarity improvement from zero(0) to (600+) of some
channels; However, DTW means of many other channels are
still close to zero, which indicate high leakage and can be
potentially exploited to reconstruct the raw ECG data.
Distribution: We further investigate the distribution of
distance correlation, as detailed in Fig. 11, which illustrates
two most correlated channels vs. two least correlated channels.
The distance correlation distribution is continuously reduced
but seems ineffective to protect the highly correlated channels.
Similarly, Fig. 12 presents DTW distribution of the most two
correlated channels vs. the least two correlated channels. The
least correlated shows clear improvements by e.g., 84 times;
however, DTW also emphasizes that increasing the number
of layers seems ineffective with the most highly correlated
channels i.e., improved only by 5 times.
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Fig. 9. Mean of distance correlation and DTW calculated for each channel of the split layer output. Each dot represents the channel of the split layer output.
Thicker the color of dot, higher the similarity between the channel of the split layer output and corresponding raw data.
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Fig. 10. Mean and standard deviation of test accuracy as incrementing the
number of convolutional layers from 2 to 8 for split learning.
B. Applying Differential Privacy on Split Layer
As the second mitigation technique, we apply differential
privacy on split layer filters activation before transmitting them
to the server. Differential privacy has already been widely used
in deep learning to protect privacy [25]. Given input space
X , output space Y , privacy parameter , and a randomisation
mechanismM. We sayM : X → Y is -differentially private
if, for all neighbouring inputs X ' X ′ and all sets of outputs
S ⊆ Y satisfy the following:
Pr [M(X) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr [M(X ′) ∈ S] (6)
Therefore, the value of  determines the strength of pri-
vacy. Specifically, we employ the Laplace differential privacy
mechanism on the split layer activation, which is widely
used for numerical data [26]. It adds noise from the Laplace
distribution, which can be expressed by a probability density
function. The level of noise relies on pre-determined  on a
scale of 10 (weakest privacy)-to-0 (strongest privacy where the
data cannot be used).
Distance Correlation Mean: Fig. 13 (a) shows the mean
of distance correlation between the intermediate split layer of
all 16 channels activation after applying different  levels of
differential privacy, and corresponding raw data. It is under
the expectation that the strongest differential privacy level of,
e.g.,  = 1 can fully protect all the output channels; However,
it comes with the cost of degrading the classification accuracy
significantly from 98.9% to only 50% as shown in Fig.14.
DTW Mean: Fig. 13 (b) shows the mean of DTW between
the intermediate split layer of all 16 channels activation
after applying various  levels of differential privacy, and
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Fig. 11. Effects of adding more layers on distance correlation distribution
of the two most correlated channels, 1© in Fig. 9, and two least correlated
channels, 2© in Fig. 9. For each distribution, µ denotes the mean. Privacy
leakage mitigation by increasing the number of layers seems effective for
least correlated filters, but it is ineffective for those showing high distance
correlation, whose correlation is still high, more than 0.68, when 8 convolu-
tional layers run on the client.
corresponding raw data. The results also suggest that strongest
differential privacy level of  = 1 can increase the dissimilarity
between the filter activation and corresponding raw data which
protects them against potential reconstruction attempts; How-
ever, strongest privacy level of  = 1 damages the accuracy
significantly as explained earlier.
Distribution: To look closely at the impact on filters after
various  levels, we also deep dive into the distribution of
distance correlation and DTW. Fig. 15 presents the distance
correlation of two most correlated channels vs. two least cor-
related channels without differential privacy, using two-layer
model. The distance correlation distribution is continuously
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Fig. 12. Effects of adding more layers on DTW distribution of the two most
correlated channels, 3© in Fig. 9, and two least correlated channels, 4© in
Fig. 9. For each distribution, µ denotes the mean. Privacy leakage mitigation
by increasing the number of layers seems effective for least correlated filters—
DTW improved by e.g., 84 times, but it is ineffective for those showing low
DTW, whose improvement is less by, e.g., 5 times, when 8 convolutional
layers run on the client.
improved after applying stronger  (from 10, 7, 5, 3, to 1) on
activation before transmitting. Also, Fig. 16 shows DTW of
two most correlated channels vs. two least correlated channels.
The DTW also improved after applying stronger  noise;
However, it seems less effective for highly correlated channels.
Summary: None of the two applied mitigation techniques
can efficiently mitigate the privacy leakage from all channels
of the split layer activation—it appears that the mitigation
is dependent on the applied mitigation techniques as well as
convolution filters. On top of that, both of them come with a
cost of accuracy reduction of the joint model, which appears
not acceptable especially in the differential privacy case.
Therefore, the RQ 2 is still hard to be answered favourably
even when our mitigation attempts are applied.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Why split learning is ineffective to preserve the privacy
for 1D CNN? To reduce the privacy leakage from the split
layer revealed by us, we have consequently applied two
specific techniques: i) increasing the number of convolutional
layers at the client-side, and ii) applying differential privacy
to the split layer output before transmission. However, both
techniques suffer the reduction of model accuracy, especially
with differential privacy. For the first technique of increasing
the number of convolutional layers to the client, it eventually
renders the other trade-off that is the computational overhead
of the client. As a matter of fact, saving the computational
overhead of the client is the other main motivation of split
learning since the client only needs to train a small fraction
of parameters of the whole model in comparison with the
federated learning required to train the whole model [3].
Therefore, increasing the number of layers before the split
layers to the client further diminishes the benefits of the split
learning from the client computational overhead perspective,
especially, when the split learning is mounted on resource-
restricted devices/agents.
Framework to evaluate split learning models: We use three
metrics to measure the privacy leakage and explore the possi-
bility of reconstructing the ECG samples’ raw data from split
layer activation. These measurements are visual invertibility,
distance correlation, and Dynamic Time Warping. The first
measurement is to show an empirical way to reconstruct the
raw data from activation. The second and third are used for
quantification. We believe these three metrics can be used as
a general framework to evaluate the potential privacy leakage
from split learning models.
How to develop more effective split learning for 1D CNN?
This is an open question that is remaining to be answered as
we do not have an affirmative answer. However, we suggest
two, but not limited to, future strategies. (i) Our first mitigation
attempt to increase the number of hidden layers shows that
it is possible to protect many of the channels in the acti-
vated output, but not all of them without significant accuracy
degradation. One would explore leakage mitigation techniques
for only a few revealing output channels. (ii) Existing split
learning follows a vertical split mechanism, which means all
the split layer output should be shared. To reduce the exposure
of all activation, one would explore a multiple-horizontal split
and share only the protected channels with the server.
Can split learning be applied to LSTM and/or RNN? As
a matter of fact, employing LSTM [27] and/or RNN [28]
served as the first trial when we intended to investigate
the practicality of dealing with sequential/time-series data.
However, we realized that LSTM and RNN are sequential
networks, while the current split technique is always vertically
split. Therefore, we found that there is no efficient means of
splitting LSTM and RNN. This eventually motivated us to
adopt 1D CNN that can be vertically split as well to deal with
pervasive sequential/time-series data. Whether split learning
can be properly applied to LSTM and/or RNN remains to be
further investigated.
Limitations: Our work has two main limitations. Firstly, we
explore the leakage in 1D CNN using one sensitive health
application, which is ECG biomedical signals. We experiment
with the ECG heartbeat samples from the widely-used MIT-
BIH dataset. Other 1D CNN applications and datasets remain
to be investigated. Secondly, privacy leakage from the split
layer of 2D CNN various applications remains to be addressed.
VII. RELATED WORK
In [3], the authors envision that it should be challenging
to reconstruct the data localized on the client-side when split
learning is employed. The main argument, generally, is that
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Fig. 14. Accuracy changes after applying differential privacy with stronger
epsilon values between 10 (weakest) and 1 (strongest).
the server can not access the weight of split layers held by
the client—this is the case for federated learning. Inverting
the weight is computationally infeasible in practice. While
their analysis focuses on 2D CNN, this paper has shown that
reconstructing the raw data in 1D CNN is more than possible.
Vepakomma et al. [23] investigated the potential privacy
leakage of split learning in 2D CNN using the MNIST dataset.
They also found high potential leakage from the split layer.
They showed that by slightly scaling the weights of all layers
before the split, it is possible to reduce the distance correlation
between the split layer activation and raw data. This scaling
mechanism is effective in 2D CNN because of the large
number of hidden layers before the split layer. However,
existing 1D CNN models such as in [11], [12] have only 2-3
hidden layers, which renders scaling their weights ineffective
and degrades the accuracy.
The other privacy leakage that has been revealed is the
membership inference. For example, Melis et al. [29] demon-
strated the membership inference attack on federated learning
by observing the gradients aggregated from the model trained
on clients. It is not surprising to envision such a membership
inference attack could be applicable to split learning. To which
extent the split learning can be resistant to inference attack
leaves interesting future work.
Other than privacy concerns of distributed learning, there
are also emerging security concerns inherent to the distributed
learning, in particular, the backdoor attacks [30], [31], [32].
Generally, a backdoor attack occurs when the training data
is tampered by a malicious party under the model training
outsource scenario. The backdoor model behaves normally
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Fig. 15. Effects of applying differential privacy on distance correlation
distribution of two most correlated channels, 5© in Fig. 13, and two least
correlated channels, 6© in Fig. 13. For each distribution, µ denotes the mean.
In contrast to applying more hidden layers, privacy mitigation by applying
differential privacy seems effective for highly correlated channels—reduced
by 63%, but it is ineffective for channels having lower distance correlation,
e.g., about 23%.
for clean inputs while misclassifying any input to the target
class when the input is stamped with a trigger. It has been
shown that federated learning is inherently vulnerable to such
a backdoor attack because the server has no control over the
local data by design [33], [34]. Therefore, participants can
manipulate their data as they want to insert a backdoor to
the joint model. We believe that split learning, for the same
reason, is also inevitably vulnerable to backdoor attacks from
the security perspective besides the privacy leakage revealed
in this work. Thus, it is important to consider this security
concern when deploying split learning in realistic security-
critical applications.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the feasibility of split learning
to deal with sensitive time-series data in particular personal
ECG signals to detect heart abnormalities. We introduced
the first implementation of split learning into the 1D CNN
model. We proposed a privacy assessment framework for
CNN models when using split learning, with three metrics:
visual invertibility, distance correlation, and DTW. Based on
this framework, we extensively evaluated the privacy leakage
exemplified by the ECG dataset. Our results demonstrate that
adopting split learning directly into 1D CNN models for
time-series/sequential data would exhibit a possibility of high
privacy leakage from feature values. Initial mitigation attempts
via i) increasing the number of layers in a CNN model and ii)
using differential privacy explicitly indicate there is a trade-
off between the degree of privacy leakage reduction and joint
model accuracy deterioration—substantial when applying the
differential privacy. Perhaps, it would be more challenging to
preserve privacy via 1D CNN models compared with 2D CNN
models. This is because 1D CNN usually has much less hidden
layers where more 1D CNN layers usually tend to affect the
model accuracy adversely. As future work, privacy leakage
through the split layer should be thoroughly evaluated for (1D
and 2D) CNN models, and corresponding effective mitigation
techniques need to be developed.
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APPENDIX
The MIT-BIH database contains 48 records retrieved from
47 different patients. About 110K ECG signals are distributed
in 48 records. Each record includes a 30-minute excerpt of
two-channel ECG signals. Also, each record has an annotation
pair that contains time positions and beat types of all ECG
signals in the paired record. Similar to [11], [12], we first
eliminate four records (record 102, 104, 107, and 217) contain-
ing paced heartbeats. Among two channels of ECG data, we
extract only the upper channel from each record as it highlights
abnormal ECG patterns [12]. In most cases, the upper channel
signals come from modified limb II (ML II); however, in the
case of record 114, the ML II signal is located at its bottom
channel. Therefore, we exclude record 114 too. A total of 43
out of 48 records are selected for further preprocessing.
Each ECG record contains n number of cardiac cycles of
heartbeat collected using electrodes placed on the skin. Each
heartbeat has three main components: the P wave that reflects
the depolarization of the atria; the QRS complex that reflects
the depolarization of the ventricles; and the T wave that reflects
the repolarization of the ventricles. Together, they can tell if
the heart is normal or has a problem.
The next step is to extract every single beat from selected
43 records. We took an equal number of samples from the
left and right side of R-peaks which is done by iterating
through the time-series annotations. One hundred values were
taken from both sides; However, the segment was discarded
if another R-peak existed in the sampled interval. The current
beat after this step has 201 sampling values containing only
single R-peak. Each signal was then rescaled by the min-max
normalization shown in Equation (7), where x is original, and
x′ is normalized value in the signal. The normalized signal
was downsampled to 128 by adopting the Fourier method.
x′ =
x−min(x)
max(x)−min(x) (7)
Denoising was the last step of refining ECG signals. We chose
biorthogonal wavelet as decomposition and reconstruction
wavelet function. The level of signal decomposition was 3.
As shown in Equation (8), we applied a soft thresholding
technique to decomposed coefficients w, based on calculated
universal threshold [35].
w′ =
{
sgn(w)(|w| − λ) (|w| ≥ λ)
0 (|w| < λ)
(8)
λ = σ
√
2 logN (9)
Equation (9) shows the universal threshold value, where σ
is the median absolute deviation of the wave coefficients at
the last level divided by 0.6745, and N is the length of the
denoising input signal, in this case, 128.
ECG heartbeat samples in the MIT-BIH database are clas-
sified into 17 categories according to morphological patterns
in a signal, labeled by independent cardiologists. Following
[12], we select 5 types of heartbeat as classification targets:
N (normal beat), L (left bundle branch block), R (right bundle
branch block), A (atrial premature contraction), V (ventricular
premature contraction). After excluding beat samples whose
labels are not included among 5 types, 96K beat samples
remain. We randomly pick 6,000 samples for N , L, R, and
V class, however, 2,490 samples for A class, as a number of
A-labeled beats in the dataset are not as sufficient as other
categories. We divide this data pool equally into the train and
test set as shown in Table I.
We further detail the training flow in Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 in terms of 1D CNN, as shown in Fig. 6. This
training flow can be directly applied to the 1D CNN ECG
classification model we made in Section III-A2.
In initialization, the client first connects to the server
through the socket and gets some training parameters to
synchronize. The initialization in Algorithm 1 and 2 require
5 parameters to be synchronized between the client and the
server. The server sends φ, η, o and n to the client that the
client should adjust to, just after accepting the connection. φ
is a random weight initializer, η is learning rate, o is a type of
optimizer, and n is the batch size. These four hyperparameters
should be synchronized on both sides to let them trained in
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which is the same way. When the client receives n, it sends
N to the server, which is the number of total batches to be
trained. n is implicitly used not only for the batch generation
but also for determining the shape of the matrix in forward
and backward propagation. N helps the server to know how
many times the forward backward propagation should be done.
If needed, the number of epochs should also be synchronized
between the client and the server. In Algorithm 1 and 2, they
give only a single epoch training process. Hence, the training
repetition process is omitted.
Forward propagation starts from the client-side. The client
first generates the batch, (x, y), which has n data extracted
from the train set D. x represents the features of data, and y
shows their labels. Starting with x, the client does the forward
propagation until layer l. If layer i is 1D convolutional layer,
f (i) can be expressed as follows [11]:
z
(i)
k = f
(i)(a(i−1)) = b(i)k +
Ci−1∑
j=1
Conv1D(a(i−1)j , w
(i)
jk ) (10)
where z(i)k is the k-th channel of the output from the i-th
layer, and a(i−1)j is the j-th channel of activation from layer
i−1. Also, w(i)jk is a convolution filter which connects between
a
(i−1)
j and z
(i)
k . Ci−1 means the number of channels in the
output from the (i − 1)-th layer. Conv1D means the regular
1D convolution operation without zero padding. b(i)k is the bias
value added after the convolution operation. Let us assume that
the server has at least one convolutional layer on its previous
side. Equation (10) tells that forward propagation on layer i
only depends on the activated output of (i−1)-th layer. In other
words, the server can continue forward propagation on layer
l + 1 by only receiving a(l) from the client. After receiving
a(l) and label y, the server is able to do forward propagation
to the L-th layer.
Before starting the backpropagation, the server calculates
loss between a(L) and y. Here, the loss function L produces E
by computing either mean squared error or cross-entropy loss
in the usual case. The backpropagation function f (i)T can be
written as follows if i-th layer is 1D convolutional layer [11].
∂E
∂a
(i)
k
= f
(i)
T (
∂E
∂z
(i+1)
k
) =
Ci+1∑
j=1
Conv1Dz(
∂E
∂z
(i+1)
k
, rev(w(i+1)kj ))
(11)
rev means reversing 1D convolution filter array, and Conv1Dz
is full 1D convolution operation with (filter size−1) zero pads
on both side. Again, Equation (11) indicates that computing
∂E
∂a(i)
only depends on ∂E
∂z(i+1)
. This means the client can
continue backpropagation by receiving just ∂E
∂a(l)
from the
server. When the client receives ∂E
∂a(l)
, the client can generate
∂E
∂z(l)
by multiplying ∂a
(l)
∂z(l)
, which is g(l)′(z(l)). Then the client
is able to do backpropagation to the first hidden layer with
(11). In backpropagation, there is no need for calculating
gradients of input because it is not trainable. For example,
the client does not have to calculate ∂E
∂a(0)
, because the input
is literally a untrainable parameter which is directly given by
the user. However, from the server perspective, the server has
to calculate the gradient of its input, ∂E
∂a(l)
, because the client
requires it to continue the backpropagation. Therefore, the
model on the server part should be forced to calculate the
gradient to the input level. To update weights, computing the
gradient of weights in layer i can be given as follows [11]:
∂E
∂w
(i)
kj
= Conv1D(a(i−1)k ,
∂E
∂z
(i)
j
) (12)
